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Abstract
This paper compares indicators of the Croatian labor market and implemented
policies with indicators and policies in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Although unemployment and long-term unemployment (which latter is particularly cor-
related with poverty in the transition countries) do not in Croatia depart from the range
in which other transition countries are positioned, still they are above their average,
which is connected with the somewhat less flexible nature of the Croatian labor market.
New findings on the effects of labor market policies in the transition countries indicate
that the process of the reform of the institutional framework through which in the last
few years the restrictiveness of Croatian employment protection legislation has been
reduced might work in the direction of reducing overall and long-term unemployment.
The paper suggests that it is possible to improve the effectiveness of the application of
active policy measures. Furthermore, a better compensation for a reduction in the
restrictiveness of the regulations would probably be an increase in average unemploy-
ment benefits rather than an extension of their duration, while greater labor market flex-
ibility, resulting from the reforms, should contribute to a greater coverage of unem-
ployed persons. The expected reduction of overall and long-term unemployment under
the influence of the new institutional framework, in spite of the possible emergence of
low-paid and insecure jobs, might alleviate the problem of poverty, because unemploy-
ment and, especially, long-term unemployment are among the prime causes of poverty
in the transition countries.
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1. Introduction
The relationship between unemployment and poverty is not a precise one. If unem-
ployment is a result of a dynamic labor market where many new jobs are created daily,
and unemployed individuals do not remain unemployed for long, even a high unem-
ployment level does not necessarily need to have serious social consequences. However,
if new jobs are few, and the unemployed represent a stagnant group of population, even
low levels of unemployment can have serious and undesirable social consequences and
represent a challenge for social policy.
In most Central and Eastern European transition countries, unemployment does not
only represent an underutilization of productive resources and loss of GDP. The transi-
tion process brought with it the closing of numerous jobs and the opening of new ones
in different sectors, but worker flows usually occurred within the group of the employed.
The appearance of long-term unemployment, social exclusion, exclusion from the labor
market and poverty are thus tightly linked in transition countries. Long-term unem-
ployed individuals are faced with an increased risk of falling into poverty, while the
depreciation of human capital due to unemployment and a weak linkage to the labor
market strengthen the vicious circle of exclusion and poverty. Therefore, understanding
the processes in the labor market in transition countries as well as the policy options
available are of especial importance in the fight against poverty and social exclusion.
As the mentioned problems are not germane to the transition countries alone, labor
market institutions in various other countries, reforms of those institutions and their rela-
tionship with labor market outcomes have recently come into the focus of many
researchers and international organizations. Organizations such as the World Bank
(Pizzati and Funck, 2002), United Nations (Jackman, 2002; Nesporova, 2002), the
International Labor Organization (Cazes and Nesporova, 2004) and the European
Commission frequently organize roundtables and publish numerous papers covering
these topics. Since Croatia is omitted from most of those studies, this paper aims to fill
the gap, to create a well-rounded picture of the main institutional features of the Croatian
labor market and outcomes perpetuated by those institutions.
The following chapter reviews the main outcomes of the Croatian labor market and
compares those with outcomes in other transition countries. Available evidence would
tend to suggest that unemployment is somewhat higher in Croatia than the average in
those countries, but it is below the top of the observed range. The same pertains to the
long-term unemployment that is related to weaker labor market dynamics; this is also
supported by the available evidence. Further on, the paper observes labor market poli-
cies that have been proved by many studies to play an important role with respect to
overall and long-term unemployment. Finally, the paper closes with recommendations
to reform some of the policies in order to reduce overall and long-term unemployment.
2. Labor market in Croatia
According to the criterion of registered unemployment, which stood at about 19%
at the end of 2003, Croatia had one of the more serious unemployment situations among
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the Central and Eastern European transition countries, most of which are “new” EU
members. However, according to the survey unemployment rate, which is a much bet-
ter basis for comparison because it is calculated according to the uniform methodology
proposed by the International Labor Organization, which is not affected by the pecu-
liarities of the national systems2, Croatia did not stand out from the group. According to
survey unemployment, Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria had the highest unemployment
rates, which amounted to 17-19% in 2003. The fact that Poland is the most successful
transition country, according to recovery of GDP in comparison to the pre-transition
period, suggests that favorable macroeconomic indicators alone are not sufficient to
solve unemployment problems. The survey unemployment rate for Croatia in that year
was about 14%, which is somewhat lower than in the countries mentioned and also rep-
resents a slight decline compared to previous years, but it is still about 3 percentage
points above the average for the selected countries. Bulgaria and Lithuania were in the
same group with Croatia, while Estonia’s and Latvia’s unemployment rates were slight-
ly lower. Four of the selected transition countries had single digit survey unemployment
rates. Romania owes its low unemployment rate to the stalling of reforms and the impor-
tance of agriculture for its economy, which is related to relatively high employment
rates. The Czech Republic has since the beginning of transition had the best unemploy-
ment indicators, but the advancement of the reforms led to unemployment growth in that
country. Hungary and Slovenia represented the two countries that had the least problem
with unemployment in 2003, and they were even slightly better than the EU average.
However, Hungary is also an example of a country where a large decline in employment
during the 1990s did not even remotely affect unemployment, pointing to some defi-
ciencies in a focus on unemployment rates3.
Along with an unemployment rate that hovered above the average of the selected
transition countries, Croatia also had higher long-term unemployment. High levels of
total and long-term unemployment in Croatia fit well within the general features of the
unemployment in Central and Eastern European countries, where high unemployment
has been tied to high long-term unemployment and exclusion from the labor market.
Fairly high long-term unemployment in Croatia has been a consequence of weaker labor
market dynamics, or fewer newly-employed workers, but also of fewer separations. The
share of employees with tenures of less than one year in total employment (accession
rate) in Croatia is amongst the lowest for the selected countries, regardless of the source
used. Moreover, average tenure4 in Croatia amounts to 12 years, which puts Croatia,
together with Slovenia, at the top of the range observed in selected countries and con-
firms that the Croatian labor market is one of the least dynamic.
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2 The peculiarities of the national systems primarily pertain to incentives to register such as privileges arising
from registering and conditions these persons have to meet in order to be able to register.
3 For example, the employment rate declined by almost 23 percentage points in Hungary between 1989 and
1996 (from almost 80% to about 55%, or to a level comparable to Croatia; according to Boeri, Burda and Kölló,
1998), which is the largest reduction among the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe. However, about
three-quarters of the employment decline pertained to exits from the labor force (often supported by early retirements,
while discouraged worker effect was important as well) so the unemployment rate remained single-digit despite recorded
employment fall.
4 Job tenure pertains to the length of continuous employment with a single employer.
Figure 1 Administrative (registered) and survey unemployment rates, 2003
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These indicators reveal that Croatia has a fairly stagnant labor market with fewer
new jobs created than is typical in other observed countries. The overall level of unem-
59
V. Šošiæ: Poverty and Labor Market Policies in Croatia
Financial Theory and Practice 29 (1), 55-73 (2005)
ployment does not have to be directly related to the dynamics of job creation and job
destruction, but lower job creation directly increases the duration of unemployment or
the level of long-term unemployment, so weaker job flows are the main cause of high
long-term unemployment in Croatia (Rutkowski, 2003).
Table 1 Employment structure according to tenure (% of total)
Less 1-2 2-5 5-10 10-20 More Average Median 
than 1 than 20 tenure tenure
Cazes and Nesporova (2001) - data refer to 1999
Czech R. 14.6 18.4* 15.3** 26.2 12.3 13.2 8.2
Estonia 18.4 6.7 31.1 23.9 10.8 9.1 6.9
Hungary 12.6 11.3 20.0 25.3 17.9 13.0 8.8
Lithuania 12.8 9.2 29.0 24.8 14.5 9.6 7.6
Poland 14.5 11.7 19.0 17.7 20.3 16.7 9.6 6.2
Slovenia 12.0 5.1 18.2 16.5 23.6 24.6 12.0
Rutkowski (2003)
Lithuania (2001) 15.4 8.9 21.6 25.4 16.8 11.9 8.3 5.0
Bulgaria (2001) 14.0 9.5 25.2 20.8 19.8 10.8 8.1 5.5
Czech R. (1995) 19.2 36.6 12.0 14.8 17.4 9.0 2.0
Croatia (2001) 9.7 5.1 17.2 21.3 20.7 26.0 12.2 8.0
author’s calculation
Croatia (2002) 13.4 6.3 16.7 21.1 19.2 23.3 11.8 7.9
Note: * refers to 1-3 years; ** refers to 3-5 years.
Sources: Rutkowski (2003), Cazes and Nesporova (2001) and author’s calculation.
Recent studies (Cazes and Nesporova, 2003) report that labor market policies
played an important role with respect to total and long-term unemployment in transition
countries, so the following chapter reviews Croatian labor market policies and compares
them with the labor market policies of other transition countries as well as advanced
market economies, wherever deemed appropriate.
3. Institutional framework, the role of economic policy and labor market
State intervention on the labor markets may, in principle, have several justifications.
It may derive from the desire to make the labor market function more efficiently, to pro-
mote alternative social goals at the expense of efficiency or simply from spillover effects
of measures not primarily aimed at the labor market. It is undeniable that there is a valid
rationale for state intervention if there are market imperfections. In transition countries,
where problems of information asymmetries and incomplete information on worker
qualifications, poorly organized labor markets with significant potential for externalities
in the job search process and barriers to labor mobility in the form of real-estate market
imperfections and weak protection of property rights are present, there is a significant
scope for state intervention to improve the functioning of the labor market. These inter-
ventions take place primarily in the form of job-search assistance, worker training pro-
grams, and other measures falling within the scope of active labor market policies.
However, state intervention was not always motivated by the promotion of effi-
ciency. Central and Eastern European countries, and Croatia too, belong to a group of
European countries that use economic policy measures in order to avoid excessive
income inequalities and uncertainty arising from the market, and state intervention
assures solidarity between the more and less fortunate. In order to achieve these goals,
countries adopt regulations such as constraints on worker dismissals or minimum wages,
or measures providing different social rights to certain groups such as unemployment
benefits or early retirement. These rights are mainly financed through labor taxes and
contributions, which are fairly high in transition countries, increasing the costs of labor
and introducing additional distortions into the labor market. Regulations and labor taxes,
along with the goals for which they are employed, also increase labor market rigidities,
hindering the reallocation of resources in transition economies and reducing incentives
to work. Therefore, the costs of government labor market policies are often studied.
Finally, the broad role of the state is wider still: its decisions on employment and wages
as well as the mode of collective bargaining used affect all other labor market partici-
pants. Government also uses measures, more or less successfully, to increase the effi-
ciency of the public administration, provide quality public goods and promote fiscal sus-
tainability, which in the end affects the economic growth rate and employment.
Cazes and Nesporova (2003) provide an up to date review of institutional frame-
works and labor market policies in Central and Eastern European countries. According
to their study, those countries employed institutional frameworks similar to those of
their western neighbors while grouping around the "middle-ground" or allowing for less
dispersion in individual measures than obtains among Western European countries.
Further on, Cazes and Nesporova (2003) empirically evaluate impacts of labor market
policies on labor market outcomes while particularly focusing on overall and long-term
unemployment. Employment protection legislation is a first such policy, although the
importance of such regulation is not clear cut. While some results of empirical investi-
gation point to association between employment protection legislation and unemploy-
ment, it is not the case according to other results. Further on, passive labor market poli-
cies also proved to be significant, especially the duration of the benefits, which seems
to particularly increase long-term unemployment, while the level of benefits does not
appear to be as important. Active labor market policies in transition countries show the
potential to lessen overall and long-term unemployment in particular. Labor taxes and
contributions do not constitute an independent economic policy measure, but they are
rather defined by public spending and other measures, while the government can influ-
ence their level and decide on the balance between direct and direct taxes, so a compar-
ative overview of labor taxation will be presented as well. Finally, higher coverage of
employees with collective bargaining drives up unemployment in transition countries,
but this will not be discussed, as government does not directly influence the bargaining
structure. Moreover, as there are no indicators for the coverage and structure of collec-
tive bargaining in Croatia, it is not possible to scrutinize their effects analytically.
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3.1. Employment protection legislation
Reform of the employment protection legislation, which took place between 2001
and mid-2003, resulted in significant reductions of restrictions imposed by such legisla-
tion. The reform enjoyed strong support from various international institutions so it was
embodied as a structural benchmark in both the agreement with the World Bank on
Structural Adjustment Loan and the Stand-by arrangement with the International
Monetary Fund. However, both the awareness of the necessity of the reform and the
final results of the negotiations were outcomes of the dialogue within the domestic tri-
partite institutions. The case for the changes of the Labor code was reinforced by the
impression that it was considerably more restrictive than similar legislation in developed
countries as well as in the neighboring transition countries, thus making the creation of
new jobs more expensive to the entrepreneurs, driving them into the sphere of the infor-
mal economy and discouraging foreign investors. This process was also in accordance
with existing tendencies in many other European economies5 (Garibaldi and Mauro,
2002) so a delay in the implementation of reforms positioned Croatia as a laggard
among them (Matkoviæ and Biondiæ, 2003).
Figure 3 International comparison of employment protection legislation index6
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5 Along with composite indices signalling less stringent labor market regulation, decentralisation of collective
bargaining is also often mentioned as a confirmation that more flexibility is being introduced into the labor markets
(Borghijs, Ederveen and de Mooij, 2003).
6 Matkoviæ and Biondiæ (2003) elaborate the definition, construction and deficiencies of EPL index measuring
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The reform process positioned Croatia close to the average restrictiveness of labor
market regulation in the “old” EU member states, according to the level of the EPL
index, making it similar to the strategies employed by most of the Central and Eastern
European countries (Riboud, Sánchez-Páramo and Silva-Jauregui, 2002). However,
their strategy with respect to relaxation of legislation governing the labor market was
somewhat specific. While the level of employment protection legislation subcomponent
describing regulation of permanent contracts was in selected Central and Eastern
European countries mostly above the average in “old” EU member states (2.5 on aver-
age in selected Central and Eastern European countries against 2.4 in “old” EU member
states), regulation of temporary employment was considerably less restrictive (1.8 on
average in selected Central and Eastern European countries against 2.2 in “old” EU
members). This observation was particularly relevant in the cases of Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, as well as Estonia, which also introduced a similar con-
figuration of labor market regulation.
Figure 4 EPL configuration – sub-indices for temporary and permanent employment
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7 The exemptions to this general tendency were countries like Ireland with flexible regulations governing permanent
contracts.
Source: Matkoviæ and Biondiæ (2003)
During the past two decades most European countries have consistently used the
deregulation of temporary employment in order increase labor market flexibility at the
margin. Central and Eastern European countries were especially successful in employ-
ing such a strategy, resulting in even more flexible regulation of temporary employment.
In accordance with this strategy, the growth of temporary employment was not only a
generator of overall employment growth7, but it also absorbed some of the employment
previously engaged on permanent contracts (Garibaldi and Mauro, 2002). Employers in
countries with stringent regulation of permanent contracts were particularly keen to use
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temporary contracts, so it is not surprising to find larger shares of temporary employ-
ment in those countries. However, the results of deregulation of temporary contracts in
Central and Eastern European countries are not yet wholly visible since the shares of
temporary employment in those countries are mostly below the shares in those “old” EU
members with similar labor market regulation configurations. Moreover, there does not
appear to be any relationship between the regulation of permanent contracts and the
extent of temporary employment in Central and Eastern European countries. Therefore,
it seems that temporary employment did not develop in transition countries nearly as
much as it did in the “old” EU members, despite a somewhat more restrictive regulation
of permanent contracts and a more flexible regulation of temporary employment in tran-
sition countries. This might also imply that labor markets of transition countries are
actually somewhat less flexible, contrary to what the aggregate level of employment
protection index suggests.
Figure 5 EPL sub-index for permanent contracts and temporary employment (as a
share of total, 2003)
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Sources: Matkoviæ and Biondiæ (2003); Eurostat (2004); DZS (2004).
Croatia stands out from other Central and Eastern European countries with a fairly
high share of temporary employment, only slightly lower than the share of temporary
employment in Slovenia and Poland. Such a position is probably to some extent a her-
itage of restrictive regulation governing permanent contracts during the 1990s, which
was significantly reduced by the recent reform. Hence, after reform of the legislation
governing permanent contracts Croatian employers face restrictions similar to the aver-
age of other transition countries, while the use of temporary contracts has evolved. This
could indicate that after the reform the actual flexibility of the labor market, which is
significantly influenced by legislation, became somewhat more favorable, especially in
comparison with other Central and Eastern European countries8.
3.2.  Passive labor market policies
Passive labor market policies include many different measures aimed at increasing
the incomes of unemployed persons. These policies usually include different measures,
and the Croatian Employment Service too administers a range of different measures.
Unemployment benefits are regularly prominent amongst them, if measured by the
costs, numbers of persons covered by them and prevalence among countries. Therefore,
comparison of the level of wages replaced by the unemployment benefits and the dura-
tion of the entitlements are usually considered the main determinants of the unemploy-
ment benefit system. The average level of unemployment benefits in Croatia, compared
to the average wage, did not significantly differ from the average level in other advanced
transition countries. Three of the six selected Central and Eastern European countries
had lower average benefits, while three had somewhat higher benefit levels. Maximum
benefit duration, that was limited to fifteen months in Croatia, was also close to the aver-
age benefit duration in selected countries9.
As can be seen from the previous table, the unemployment benefit system in
Croatia, with respect to the average benefit level10 (it was about a quarter of the average
wage, or roughly the same as the average of selected Central and Eastern European
countries) and benefit duration (it was one year, also close to the average of selected
countries) does not differ from unemployment insurance systems that are in place in
most of the selected Central and Eastern European countries. Somewhat lower expendi-
ture levels in Croatia than in the selected countries resulted from lower coverage of
unemployed persons with benefits than it is the case in any of the selected countries.
Indicators of unemployment benefit systems vary a great deal among transition
countries, but it is apparent that countries with higher average benefits tend to limit ben-
efit duration and vice versa. However, Croatia is somewhat specific, due to fairly low
spending on passive labor market policies, measured as a share of GDP, compared to
other transition countries. The spending on passive labor market policies in proportion
to the registered unemployment amounted to only about a third of the transition coun-
tries’ average. Even after the correction by the “real”, or survey unemployment rate,
spending on unemployment benefits in Croatia was lower than the average of transition
countries, similar to the expenditures in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while a lower
level of expenditure is found only in Estonia, which is known for its flexible labor mar-
ket. A fairly low level of spending was a consequence of high long-term unemployment
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8 Such a general conclusion does not have to reflect actual position of all different groups of workers so detailed
analysis would indicate that older workers (the most protected) are not very flexible, while younger worker happen
to be very flexible.
9 Unemployed persons with more than 30 (men) or 25 years (females) of working experience are exempted
from such regulation and their unemployment benefits do not expire except in cases of reemployment or retirement.
This experience limit will be gradually extended until 2007 in line with extension of pension age.
10 There should be some variation in the level of unemployment benefits, based on previous earnings, but in
practice it operates as a flat-rate system.
and unemployment rates for young people, who as a rule have less work experience, and
therefore exhaust their unemployment insurance benefits more quickly.
Table 2 Comparative overview of unemployment benefit systems
Average Benefit duration Coverage (%)
unemployment (months)
benefit
(% of average wage)
Czech R. 20 6 49
Estonia 7 3-6 55
Hungary 23 12 74
Poland 40 12-24 23
Slovakia 33 6-12 28
Slovenia 44 3-24 33
Average 28 44
Croatia 26 3-15 19
Sources: Riboud, Sánchez-Páramo and Silva-Jauregui (2002) and authors' calculation based on
CES data.
Table 3 Spending on passive labor market policies in Central and Eastern European
countries
(in % of GDP) Spending in Spending in
proportion to registered proportion to survey 
unemployment rate unemployment rate
(in % of GDP) (in % of GDP)
Czech R. 0.31 0.04 0.04
Estonia 0.08 0.01 0.00
Hungary 0.56 0.06 0.08
Poland 1.71 0.12 0.10
Slovakia 0.52 0.05 0.05
Slovenia 0.89 0.11 0.16
Average 0.68 0.06 0.07
Croatia 0.44 0.02 0.04
Note: figures for Croatia pertain to the 1997-2000 average, while figures for other countries pertain
to the different years for which they are available.
Sources: Riboud, Sánchez-Páramo and Silva-Jauregui (2002) and authors' calculation based on
CES data.
Reform of the job-search assistance, which was launched in early 2002, was the first
step in the comprehensive institutional reform of the labor market. The reform was moti-
vated by the awareness that the CES register was principally useful for the administra-
tion of social rights, while it was not performing its primary function, which is assisting
in job search. The reform introduced steps to separate social rights from the rights result-
ing from the unemployment status. Thus, social rights were no longer supposed to
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depend on the status of unemployment, but rather on the individual’s real material posi-
tion. In order to achieve this, it is important to enhance the network of government insti-
tutions and link existing databases on incomes and different forms of government trans-
fers. In addition, criteria for registering with the CES were made stricter with respect to
acceptance of job offers and availability for work. Demonstration of greater job-search
effort was also required from the registered unemployed. Reform has opened the doors
to private initiatives in the sphere of employment intermediation, which soon resulted in
opening of private agencies for job search assistance, but they should also be allowed to
participate in other areas of active labor market policies.
Figure 6 Employment protection legislation and spending on passive policies
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11 The highest amount of unemployment benefit was raised from 900 to 1000 kunas, which to some extent
represents indexation of unemployment benefits with the costs of living, additional one-off benefits were introduced
for workers with more that 20 years of tenure, while the longest duration of unemployment benefit was extended

































Spending on passive policies, per unemployed (1999, PPP USD thousands)
Sources: Matkoviæ and Biondiæ (2003); OECD (1999); Young (2003) and authors' calculation based
on CES data.
As a next step in the reform, unemployment benefits were made more generous at
the beginning of 2004 by a rise in their level and an extension of their maximum dura-
tion11 as a compensation for the reduction of the strictness of the employment protection
legislation. Employment protection legislation and unemployment benefits are substi-
tutes as insurance against loss of income, so workers should be indifferent if former is
replaced by the later. Such a model is advocated by the EU and ILO (Young, 2003). The
ILO especially highlights the example of Denmark, a country that manages to use pas-
sive and especially active labor market policies along with flexible employment protec-
tion legislation in order to reduce the risk of income loss for workers. This recommen-
dation seemed suitable in the Croatian case, which until recently combined fairly low
spending on active and passive labor market policies with stringent employment pro-
tection legislation regulation.
However, increase of the coverage of unemployed persons has to be carefully intro-
duced as some studies indicate that the duration of unemployment benefits increases the
average duration of unemployment, while this is not true of the average benefit level
(Cazes and Nesporova, 2003). Therefore, it seems that the replacement of employment
protection legislation with passive policy measures has not been done in an optimal
fashion. Spending on passive policies should have been increased by a rise in the aver-
age benefit level, if such a solution could be reached in negotiations, while a higher cov-
erage of unemployed persons will result from a more dynamic labor market, which is
related to the reform of the legislation. Finally, greater reliance on unemployment ben-
efits as insurance against loss of income should be matched by measures to activate the
unemployed that are in part implemented through the reform of the employment service.
3.3. Active labor market policies
Active labor market policies, unlike the passive policy measures which are used to
insure the unemployed financially, are most often used to reduce the imperfections
existing in the labor market and promote more efficient outcomes as well as to modify
those market outcomes towards socially acceptable ones. In other words, those measures
are usually used to increase employment and wages of particular categories in the labor
market that are thought to be particularly exposed to the risk of unemployment and
poverty. The level of spending on active labor market policies in Croatia during the late
1990s did not significantly differ from the average spending levels in selected Central
and Eastern European countries. However, average spending in all those countries was
far below the average spending in “old” EU members and OECD member states, prob-
ably reflecting financial constraints, but also limited experience with the design and
implementation of those policies.
Table 4 Spending on active labor market policies
Total spending Spending on active labor market
1985 1989 1993 1998 1985 1989 1993 1998
Czech R. 0.30 0.36 0.16 0.13
Hungary 2.76 1.01 0.65 0.39
Poland 2.45 1.00 0.58 0.44
Average – transition
countries 1.84 0.79 0.47 0.32
Croatia 0.24*
EU 2.91 2.53 3.63 2.80 0.86 0.86 1.13 1.07
OECD 2.32 2.09 3.03 2.29 0.72 0.72 0.94 0.87
* Figure for Croatia pertains to the 1997-2000 average due to large variation between individual years.
Sources: Dar and Tzannatos (1999) and authors' calculation based on CES data.
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Although macroeconomic evidence indicates that active labor market policies are
efficient on the whole (Cazes and Nesporova, 2003), it does not necessarily mean that
every such program was successful. Countries that implement such programs usually
carefully evaluate their actual impacts or first implement those programs on an experi-
mental basis. There is hardly any information on the impacts of active labor market poli-
cies in Croatia so it is hard to say how successful these policies are12. However, some
recommendations on the possible ways to increase the effectiveness of active labor mar-
ket policies can be made on the basis of experience existing in other countries. Wage
subsidies, accounting for the majority of the spending on active labor market in Croatia,
were general, meaning that that these measures were not targeted to particular groups,
rather most of the persons registered as unemployed were eligible for some form of
wage subsidy. It might be assumed that such general wage subsidies were aimed at
increasing total employment and reducing unemployment, although their goal was not
formally specified in their disposition. However, some of the studies report stronger
impact of active labor market policies on long-term unemployment than on total unem-
ployment (Cazes and Nesporova, 2003) so their efficiency in achieving the presumed
goals is questionable. Moreover, rigorous empirical evaluations indicate that net job cre-
ation, after deadweight, substitution and displacement effects are excluded13, in none of
the countries that implemented such measures exceeded a third of subsidized persons
and often remains far below that (Dar and Tzannatos, 1999). Therefore, the efficiency
of the active labor market policies implemented is questionable.
The main priority in the area of active labor market policies should be to develop an
‘evaluation culture’ and routinely test for their effects. This would help avoid the stop-
go approach to active labor market policies, spending major funds and then closing the
programs, which characterized implementation of active labor market policies until
now. Programs should be initiated with modest funds and decide on their expansion or
closing and redirecting funds into other, more efficient programs only after evaluation.
Measures should also be better focused on the long-term unemployed and those at risk
of falling into long-term unemployment, rather than to all registered unemployed, which
proved to be inefficient in many countries. 
3.4. Labor tax wedge 
Labor taxes and social contributions (direct taxation) are one of the most abundant
sources of tax revenues in most countries (and in Croatia direct taxes comprise about
half of total tax revenues). Some studies attribute significant part of unemployment
growth to the increased taxation of labor (Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel, 2005) and call
attention to the goal of many European countries to reduce labor taxes and contributions
in order to encourage work and employment. Despite recent efforts to reduce direct tax-
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12 One of the public works programs is an exception. However, evaluation showed that it improved neither
employability nor wages of the participants after it expired. The program employed only limited resources.
13 Deadweight effect of wage subsidies pertains to persons that would get employed in the absence of wage
subsidies. Substitution effect refers to employing a subsidized person instead of a non-subsidized one. However,
substitution can be socially justified if it helps hard-to-employ individuals. Finally, the displacement effect refers to
job losses in enterprises that do not employ subsidized workers due to competitive pressures from subsidized
enterprises/individuals.
ation, the average tax wedge on labor is still high in most European countries - it aver-
aged about 40% in EU member states in 2003 (which is 1 percentage point less than in
the previous year), while in four advanced transition countries that are also OECD mem-
bers it averaged 44%. With such a perspective in mind, average tax wedge that amount-
ed to 39% of total labor costs in Croatia does not seem particularly high. The tax wedge
in Croatia was about 1 percentage point below the EU average and as much as 5 per-
centage points below the average of selected advanced transition countries14.
The burden of labor taxes and contributions in transition countries was especially
heavy if their income levels are taken into the account (compared to poorer “old” EU
members, such as Greece and Portugal). Such a heavy burden is a consequence of the
widespread use of early retirement schemes and the rise in social expenditures that
accompanied growing and high unemployment, which helped create a social consensus
on the necessity of reforms. On the other hand, the taxation level discouraged job cre-
ation and resulted in a partial shift of employment from the formal to the informal
sphere. The comparatively low taxation burden on labor in Croatia did not occur as an
accident, but as a result of persistent policies intended to reduce the tax wedge. The total
tax wedge on labor in 1995 amounted to 48% of total labor costs, which was excep-
tionally high, even by the standards of “old” EU member states and transition countries.
Until 2001 the tax wedge was reduced to 41% and its decreasing tendency was contin-
ued afterwards (Rutkowski, 2003).
Bearing all this in mind, it seems worth asking whether it is necessary to pursue
even further reductions of labor taxation, as recently discussed in public, and if so how
to do it. There are several reasons why the labor tax wedge should be further decreased,
irrespective of recent efforts in many European countries to do so. First of all, the labor
tax wedge in Croatia is still higher than it is OECD member states (including EU mem-
ber states with fairly high levels of taxes and contributions) as well as in poorer “old”
EU members (Greece and Portugal) that are more comparable to Croatia. Furthermore,
total labor costs in Croatia are higher than labor costs in transition countries with simi-
lar productivity levels, such as Poland and Hungary, so unit labor costs in Croatia are
the highest among the Central and Eastern European transition countries. Reduction of
labor taxes could probably temper the growth of labor costs to a greater degree than
reduction of other taxes and therefore improve the cost competitiveness of domestic
enterprises. Finally, the Croatian unemployment rate, as previously discussed, is, despite
a recent decline, still high, and easing the pressure on labor costs by reductions in labor
taxes could help employment recovery. 
While the reduction of labor taxes and contributions can be a mid-term goal, in the
short run reducing the taxation of individuals with poor qualifications who earn low
incomes15 should be a priority because it can improve the position of those workers and
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14 International comparisons of average tax wedge should be interpreted with caution. Individual tax systems
are usually quite complicated with many different rates, deductions and exceptions, so tax wedges calculated on the
basis of an average production worker can be misguided. This may particularly be the case if tax systems differ with
respect to their progressiveness, if there are differences in income distributions or if there are differences in public
goods and services workers receive from the state.
15 There are different ways to implement it in practice, such as negative taxes, which is, however, hard to recommend
in Croatia because it would strengthen incentives to underreport incomes. 
Table 5 Average tax wedge (as % of average total labor cost for single production
workers without children, 2003)
Income Social security Social security Total social Total tax 
tax contributions contributions security wedge
(employee) (employer) contributions
Austria 8 14 23 37 45
Belgium 20 11 23 34 54
Denmark 32 11 1 12 44
Finland 20 5 19 24 44
France 9 10 29 39 48
Greece 0 12 22 34 34
Ireland 10 5 10 15 25
Italy 14 7 25 32 46
Luxembourg 8 12 12 24 32
Netherlands 7 22 14 36 43
Germany 17 17 17 34 51
Portugal 5 9 19 28 33
Spain 9 5 23 28 37
Sweden 18 5 25 30 48
United Kingdom 14 8 9 17 31
“old” EU average 13 10 17 27 40
Czech R. 9 9 26 35 44
Hungary 10 9 27 36 46
Poland 5 21 17 38 43
Slovak R. 5 9 28 37 42
Average transition
Central Europe 7 12 25 37 44
Croatia 7 17 15 32 39
Australia 23 0 6 6 29
Iceland 24 0 5 5 29
Japan 5 10 12 22 27
Canada 16 6 10 16 32
Korea 2 4 8 12 14
Mexico 2 1 13 14 16
New Zealand 21 0 0 0 21
Norway 19 7 11 18 37
USA 15 7 7 14 29
Switzerland 9 10 10 20 29
Turkey 12 12 18 30 42
OECD average 12 8 15 23 35
Sources: OECD (2004) authors' calculation.
70
V. Šošiæ: Poverty and Labor Market Policies in Croatia
Financial Theory and Practice 29 (1), 55-73 (2005)
encourage their employment. Reduction of labor taxation has been implemented in
many different ways during the previous decade - by increasing existing tax deductions
and introducing new exemptions, reductions of tax rates and contribution rates. There is
wide range of instruments now as well, but each of those instruments bears specific
implications for different groups of workers. Since workers in Croatia on average pay
about five times as much in contributions as in taxes, which is specific for all transition
countries due to unfavorable demographics and widespread use of early retirement, even
a modest reduction of contributions could influence income more than a significant
reduction of income tax. Such an effect is especially visible in the case of low-income
workers. For example, taxes account for 10 kunas or about 0.5% of total labor costs of
a worker earning the minimum wage (since January 1st 2005 amounting to 2080 kunas),
while the total tax wedge, comprising mostly social security contributions, amounts to
about 700 kunas or 32% of total labor costs. Therefore, the manipulation of taxes (as
applied in 2005) produces almost no effect on incomes and the labor costs of low-
income workers. An alternative route, if one assumes that no negative taxes will be
introduced, would be to reduce social security contributions. However, one has to
approach such an issue with a caution. Pension reform was an important step toward
establishing a link between pension contributions and pensions, and reduction of pen-
sion contributions could weaken that link. A reduction in health contributions would not
have such an effect as health contributions are not linked to actual health benefits and
therefore resemble taxes. Moreover, health insurance, while a universal benefit, is large-
ly financed through contributions paid by the employees.
4. Conclusion 
Although total and long-term unemployment in Croatia are somewhat higher than
the average for other transition countries, these labor market indicators do not diverge
from the range in which they move in those countries. However, this does not mean that
unemployment is not a serious social problem and that reducing unemployment should
not be one of the priorities for the economic policy. Moreover, organizations adminis-
tering labor market programs have considerable experience and are probably capable of
administering more ambitious programs, while we can probably expect further improve-
ments with the opening of labor market policies for private initiative. Still, an impres-
sion cannot be avoided that some of the implemented solutions were not always optimal
and did not contribute towards reducing unemployment, underemployment, social
exclusions and poverty as much as they might have done.
The most important reforms implemented during the past few years managed to
reduce the restrictiveness of the employment protection legislation and increase reliance
on passive labor market policies, which is one of the ILO and EU recommendations. The
duration of benefits was extended, which seemed justified due to the low coverage of
unemployed persons. However, a reduction in the legal restrictiveness will contribute to
greater labor market flexibility and higher coverage. Increased reliance on passive mea-
sures was accompanied by policies to activate unemployed persons, which was espe-
cially important due to the large disparity between registered and survey unemployment,
which also made job-assistance difficult. The third important element in this "triangle of
policies" is active policy measures. Spending on active policies in Croatia did not fall
behind such spending in other transition countries, although it is not possible to discuss
their efficiency due to lack of evaluations. Therefore, the most important recommenda-
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tion pertains to developing the culture of evaluation, while the programs are in the ini-
tial phase, prior to the investment of significant funds. Moreover, judging from the expe-
rience of other transition countries, it can be assumed that better focus of these measures
on particularly disadvantaged groups would probably improve their efficiency. 
Increasing labor market flexibility can sometimes have adverse consequences on
poverty due to the emergence of low paid and insecure jobs. However, since unem-
ployment and especially long-term unemployment are among the prime causes of pover-
ty in Croatia, a more flexible labor market would probably contribute to the reduction
of poverty by increasing job creation, especially for low-skilled workers. Even if a more
flexible labor market helped to create a new group of employees likely to remain under
the poverty threshold, greater flexibility is not necessarily a bad solution, since poorly
paid jobs are often stepping stones out of poverty and towards better paid jobs. Static
income distribution can overestimate inequality that exists over the life cycle if there is
such a dynamics on the labor market (Elmeskov, 1998). As labor market reform coin-
cided with the rapid expansion of the economic activity, synergic effects of economic
growth and reform will probably fuel employment growth and the reduction of unem-
ployment and long-term unemployment.
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